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U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE  







This memorandum describes the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC”) in monitoring and, where appropriate, regulating the use of 
research reports by investment banking firms in connection with securities transactions.
1 The 
memorandum addresses the historical system of regulation, which continues in large measure 
to apply. It also examines the new initiatives taken, following a number of prominent 
corporate, accounting and banking scandals and a significant decline in U.S. and international 
capital markets, to supplement the current system in what some have dubbed the “post-Enron 
era”. 
A.  U.S. securities regulation: an overview 
It may be helpful to preface a consideration of the SEC’s activities with a brief 
overview of the U.S. securities regulatory system as a whole. The SEC is undeniably the 
cornerstone of that system. It operates, however, solely under authority delegated to it by the 
U.S. legislature.
2 Furthermore, in carrying out its mission it relies heavily on so-called self-
regulatory organizations (“SROs”)
3, in particular the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (“NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).  
                                                 
1   The texts of the relevant statutes and SEC or SRO rules frequently refer to the relevant financial 
institutions by using technical terms defined for a specific purpose (e.g., “broker-dealers” or, in the 
case of certain NASD rules, “members”). In the interest of simplicity, this memorandum will refer to 
“investment banks” or “banks”. These and similar financial institutions may generally engage in 
securities transactions in the United States only if they are registered as brokers and/or dealers pursuant 
to § 15 or § 15B of the Exchange Act and will in virtually all cases also be member firms of NASD. 
2   See Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), § 19; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
as amended (the “Exchange Act”), § 23 (rulemaking authority), §§ 21-21C (investigative and 
enforcement authority). Congress established the SEC through Exchange Act § 4.  
3   Self regulatory organizations in the broader sense (e.g., the regional educational boards that accredit 
universities) play an important role in many areas of American society. In U.S. securities law, however, 
“self regulatory organization” is a narrowly defined technical term; see Exchange Act § 3(26). For the 
purposes of this memorandum, the two most important SROs are the NYSE and the NASD. The 
NYSE, by far the nation’s largest securities exchange, sets rules for the companies listed on, as well as 
for firms trading on or through, the exchange. The NASD’s role is even broader. It sets rules for the 
Nasdaq (which is, technically, not a securities exchange) analogous to those set by the NYSE for its 
exchange. More importantly, it also sets the rules that govern its member institutions, the body of 
investment banks, brokers, dealers and traders. - 2 - 
The body of U.S. statutory securities law is entirely the creation of Congress. 
Congress has given the SEC broad powers to implement and enforce these laws, but these 
powers are strictly bounded by the framework of the statutes. The SEC must act on 
congressional mandate, and may not make rules or take enforcement actions outside the 
bounds of that mandate. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “SOA”), the centerpiece of 
“post-Enron” U.S. legislation, is in form typical of statutory securities law. It directs the SEC 
to implement certain rules (in many cases permitting the SEC to delegate some or all of this 
function to SROs). It leaves to the SEC broad discretion in “filling in the blanks” of the 
congressional mandate. However, it also directly implements a number of significant changes 
to the body of statutory securities law itself. If the SEC, in its rulemaking or enforcement 
actions, exceeds its mandate, the courts may (as they have done in the past) hold that there 
was no authority for the SEC action.
4 
Below the SEC stand the SROs. In their rulemaking function SROs do not act merely 
as private bodies adopting internal by-laws. Rather, they are also exercising public power 
delegated by the SEC (which must approve, and may play an active role in developing, 
proposed SRO rules).
5 Thus NASD and NYSE rulemaking must be understood as an integral 
part of the SEC’s regulation of U.S. securities markets. 
It is important to bear in mind that the SEC is both a regulatory and an enforcement 
agency. The first sections of this memorandum focus on SEC rulemaking as well as on 
rulemaking carried out by SROs under SEC-delegated authority, addressing both currently 
existing rules and proposed modifications and additions to those rules. The final section 
discusses recent SEC enforcement action against alleged abuse of research reports. Because 
new SEC regulation of research activities remains at present a work in progress, it should be 
noted that all such enforcement actions—even where initiated after the enactment of the 
SOA—are taken under existing rules. 
B.  Research reports: parallel focus on distribution and on conflicts of interest in 
preparation 
When properly prepared and used, research reports are a valuable source of 
information to the capital markets. The SEC has repeatedly acknowledged the vital 
contributions of research to investor education and market efficiency.  
Nonetheless, research reports are a subject of interest to the SEC from two distinct 
perspectives. First, the distribution of research reports can, under certain circumstances, be in 
potential conflict with one of the pillars of the U.S. securities law system: securities may be 
offered or sold publicly only by means of a registration statement meeting strictly defined 
requirements.  
Secondly, regulators are concerned that research reports be prepared in a true spirit of 
independence. Research reports are typically produced, however, by research analysts 
employed by financial institutions. Unless these institutions conduct no investment banking 
activity—and such institutions are the exception—there is an innate conflict of interest 
between the analyst’s role as an independent evaluator of companies and their securities, and 
the bank’s desire to attract business from companies and make markets in securities. In 
                                                 
4   See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 could 
not impose liability for negligent misconduct when the statutory provision under which the rule was 
promulgated made clear Congress’s intention to penalize only intentional misconduct). 
5   Exchange Act § 19 and rules thereunder. - 3 - 
addition, whether or not a bank engages in investment banking activities, it and its individual 
analysts face a potential conflict of interest in the temptation to use research reports to 
manipulate the market in a security for the bank’s or the analyst’s gain. Abuse of research 
runs afoul of another pillar of U.S. securities law: that investors be presented with all material 
facts necessary for an informed investment decision, and that material misstatements be 
forbidden. 
With respect to the first concern, the SEC’s position is long established and has 
generated a corresponding body of practice in the banking community. There are no 
indications that the SEC will revisit current doctrine in this area as a result of the events that 
gave rise to the SOA. By contrast, these events have spurred a major review by the SEC (and, 
subsidiarily, by the SROs) of currently existing conflict-of-interest regulation. Although the 
SOA directs the SEC to take a number of actions in this area, the SEC and the SROs had 
begun to revise and expand their rules even prior to the SOA’s entry into force. 
II.  Historical and current approaches 
A.  SEC regulation of research distribution in connection with securities offerings 
The SEC has long been concerned that research reports could be used as part of the 
selling effort in a securities offering. It is a fundamental principle of U.S. securities law that, 
absent an available exemption, securities may be offered and sold only by means of a 
prospectus, contained in a registration statement that satisfies the requirements of the 
Securities Act.
6 Given the Securities Act’s very broad definitions of “offer” and 
“prospectus”
7, a research report used to induce interest in purchasing a security could be 
deemed a “defective” prospectus; such use of the report could be deemed an offering made 
prior to the filing of a registration statement. The penalties for either violation can be 
draconian. In addition, research reports typically contain statements (e.g., projected financial 
information, target share prices) that, from concerns over potential liability, would normally 
never be found in a prospectus. 
On the other hand, the SEC recognizes the important role of research reports in 
disseminating to the market information about issuers and their securities. The SEC 
promulgated Rule 139
8 in order to achieve a balance between these concerns. This rule 
provides a “safe harbor” for research reports covering an issuer or any of its securities 
published by members of an underwriting syndicate participating in an offering of securities 
by that issuer, even prior to the filing of a registration statement. In order for a syndicate 
member to enjoy this safe harbor, adequate information about the issuer must be publicly 
                                                 
6   Securities Act §§ 5, 10. 
7   Securities Act §§ 2(a)(3), 2(a)(10). In marked contrast to the laws of some non-U.S. jurisdictions (as 
well as to non-securities related U.S. law), under the Securities Act an “offer” can be any action that 
might reasonably be expected to induce interest in a security. See Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 
S.E.C. 843, 1959 WL 2709 (1959) (holding that, in securities law, an offer is “not limited to 
communications which constitute an offer in the common law contract sense”). Similarly, a 
“prospectus” may be any written or otherwise recorded communication that offers (in the broad 
meaning of the Securities Act) a security. 
8   17 C.F.R. § 230-139 (1995) (“Rule 139”). - 4 - 
available.
9 In addition, the syndicate member must, prior to its involvement in the (proposed 
or active) offering, have published research concerning the issuer “with reasonable regularity 
in the ordinary course of business.”
10 Furthermore, any recommendation by the research 
analyst contained in the report published under the safe harbor must be no more favorable 
than the recommendation contained in the most recent report published by the syndicate 
member prior to its involvement in the offering.
11 
In addition to formal SEC rulemaking, a body of “best practices” has developed 
within the U.S. banking community to address the potential conflict between the registration 
principle of the Securities Act and the legitimate use of research reports. Thus banks assisting 
an issuer in a securities offering typically adhere to internal rules calling for “restricted 
periods” and “blackout periods” during which publication of research covering the issuer is 
limited or banned outright. These codes of practice are, obviously, of greatest importance in 
cases where the Rule 139 safe harbor is unavailable. It is important to understand that these 
practices are the result of private initiatives by banks in consultation with their legal advisors. 
SEC rules neither prescribe blackout periods nor grant a safe harbor for their use. 
Nevertheless, given their long establishment, it is fair to conclude that the SEC tacitly regards 
these practices as an appropriate response to its concerns. It is interesting to note that NASD 
and NYSE have borrowed from these unofficial best practices in their “post-Enron” 
rulemaking aimed at reducing potential research-related conflicts of interest; see below, 
§ III.C.  
B.  SEC and SRO approaches to analyst conflicts of interest 
The SEC, NASD and NYSE have all been long aware of the potential for conflicts of 
interest in research activities. Prior to the events of the early 2000s, however, these regulators 
lacked tools designed to prevent and punish many of the specific practices that gave rise to 
these conflicts. The SEC relied chiefly on the so-called general antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws. The SROs did require certain disclosures concerning financial interests of 
banks in the issuers covered by their research analysts. These disclosures were, however, 
relatively minimal. The NASD and NYSE standards were inconsistent with each other. The 
NASD rule required no disclosures concerning individual analysts; the NYSE rules did 
require such disclosures, but in an extremely weak form. Perhaps most importantly, both sets 
of rules failed entirely to address structural pressures that could subject analysts to powerful 
conflicts of interest. The SEC’s proposed new rules and the SRO’s new rules (which are 
already in effect) represent a dramatic change to this approach; see below, §§ III.B.,C. 
1.  SEC regulation of analyst conflicts of interest 
In one sense it would be accurate to claim that the SEC has not had (and, pending the 
final promulgation of the rules discussed below in § III.B., still does not have) any rules 
addressing conflicts of interest in the use of research. This claim is indeed accurate, but 
misleading. It is true that there has to date been no body of rules directly addressing analyst 
conflicts. Nevertheless, in the antifraud provisions of the securities laws the SEC has long 
                                                 
9   Rule 139(a). Essentially, the issuer satisfies this informational requirement if it has filed reports with 
the SEC under the Exchange Act for at least one year prior to the publication of the research report. 
Under certain circumstances, this period may be shortened with respect to foreign private issuers. 
10   Rule 139(b)(1)(i). 
11   Rule 139(b)(3). - 5 - 
had a powerful weapon against (among many others) banks and analysts that use research to 
manipulate markets or otherwise gain an improper private advantage. 
Chief among these weapons are Exchange Act § 10 and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 
thereunder.
12 Together, these provisions make it unlawful to use any “manipulative or 
deceptive device”, to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact”, or to “engage in any … fraud or deceit” in connection with any securities 
transaction. 
Rule 10b-5 is in no way limited to research activities, nor do most SEC enforcement 
actions based on the rule involve analysts or the research activities of their employers. 
Indeed, a literal reading of the rule might conclude—incorrectly
13—that research activities 
(which may not at first sight appear to have any connection with a securities transaction) do 
not fall within the rule’s purview. This is not the case, as a review of the enforcement actions 
described in § IV below makes clear. The antifraud provisions of the securities laws empower 
the SEC to take determined, and at times devastating, action against analysts and banks that 
use research in a manner that violates those provisions. 
What the antifraud provisions do not do is require banks to adopt structures intended 
to discourage conflicts of interest from arising in the first place. Nor do they impose on banks 
and analysts the duty to make public disclosure of facts that could indicate potential conflicts. 
The latter is a particularly notable omission, given the SEC’s guiding philosophy that 
“sunshine is the best disinfectant”. The SEC does use prohibitions and enforcement actions 
where these are mandated by law or seem necessary to uphold the law’s spirit. Where 
possible, however, the SEC usually prefers to adopt a laisser-faire approach, provided always 
that investors are presented with the full and accurate disclosure they need to decide for 
themselves whether an investment is wise.
14 As discussed in § III.B. below, the SEC’s 
proposed new rulemaking represents a fundamental shift from its historical approach to 
regulating abusive research practices. 
 
                                                 
12   17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) (“Rule 10b-5”). Although Securities Act § 17 is of similar effect, it 
applies only in the case of securities offerings. Other “antifraud” provisions, e.g. Securities Act §§ 11, 
12, can impose liability for material misstatements or omissions in circumstances that fall far short of 
actual fraud (under § 11, for example, issuers are strictly liable). These provisions, however, apply only 
to public securities offerings. (§ 11 applies by definition only to public offerings subject to the 
Securities Act’s registration requirement. As the result of the controversial Supreme Court decision in 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S.Ct. 1061 (1995), § 12 applies only to public offerings, although this 
would include those exceptional public offerings not subject to registration. The decision does, 
however, leave open the possibility that a future court decision could impose § 12 liability in the case 
of private offerings that share certain characteristics with public offerings.) Exchange Act § 10 and 
Rule 10b-5, by contrast, apply “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”, whether or not 
the transaction is effected by the person accused of the violation and whether or not in the context of an 
offering. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Basic Indus., Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S.Ct. 
978 (1988). 
13   See above, note 12. 
14   See generally S. Hutter, Zulassung von Aktien einer deutschen Aktiengesellschaft an einer US-
amerikanischen Börse, in I ARBEITSHANDBUCH FÜR UNTERNEHMENSÜBERNAHMEN, § 23B. (J. Semler 
& R. Volhard eds., 2001); J. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959). - 6 - 
2.  SRO disclosure requirements 
Even prior to the events that prompted the passage of the SOA, NASD and NYSE 
rules required banks to disclose certain potential conflicts of interest when publishing a 
research report recommending the purchase or sale of a specific security. The disclosure 
requirements of the then-existing NASD and NYSE rules
15, however, were weak. 
Furthermore, although they were generally similar in content, they differed in certain 
important respects, resulting in inconsistency.
16 
Prior to the reforms discussed in § III.C. below, the NASD and NYSE rules did 
generally require banks to disclose certain conflicts of interest when a bank (or one of its 
analysts) recommended the purchase or sale of a specific security. The bank was required to 
disclose whether it made a market in the security and whether it had been manager or co-
manager of a public offering of the issuer within the last three years. In addition, banks were 
required generally to disclose any financial interest in the recommended security.  
The NASD rule required banks and their officers or partners to disclose any 
ownership (above a nominal threshold) of options, rights or warrants to purchase any 
securities of the issuer whose securities were recommended in the report. The rule did not, 
however, require these persons to disclose ownership of the issuer’s common shares. The 
analyst responsible for the report had no duty to disclose any financial interest in the issuer’s 
securities. The NYSE rule applied both to the bank and its analysts, and required disclosure 
of all holdings of the issuer’s securities, including common shares. Banks could, however, 
fulfill the requirements of this rule by using extremely vague disclosure language, e.g., “The 
bank or its employees may own securities of a recommended issuer.”  
Both sets of rules were marked by serious lacunae. In addition to the inapplicability to 
analysts of the NASD rules’ disclosure requirements, neither the NASD nor the NYSE rules 
governed public appearances by analysts. Nor did they address practices that could place 
analysts under pressure to modify their opinions to serve the interests of banks or issuers. 
As with the proposed new SEC rules, the new NASD and NYSE rules discussed in 
§ III.C. below, which became effective in April 2002, represent a significant change of course 
from the historical SRO regulation of research activities. Although these new SRO rules are 
already in effect, this memorandum discusses them in greater detail below, as they will form 
an important part of, and should be read in conjunction with, the SEC’s implementation of 
the SOA through its proposed new regulation governing research practices. 
III.  The “post-Enron” era: Sarbanes-Oxley and the new SEC/SRO initiatives  
A number of spectacular corporate, accounting and investment banking scandals in 
recent years, together with overall serious declines in the U.S. and global capital markets, has 
spurred new efforts at reform on the congressional, SEC and SRO levels. The keystone of 
these reforms is the SOA. As discussed above, however, both the SEC and the SROs acting 
under SEC-delegated authority had already taken steps toward reform even prior to the 
SOA’s enactment. 
                                                 
15   NYSE Rule 472; NASD Rule 2210.  
16   See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908 (May 10, 2002). - 7 - 
A.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Among the concerns that Congress addressed in the SOA was the perceived use by 
investment banks of their research analysts not to provide the market with an objective 
evaluation of securities but rather to assist the banks’ sales efforts and to attract business from 
potential issuers. Section 501 (Analyst Conflicts of Interest) of the SOA adds to the Exchange 
Act a new § 15D to address this concern.  
Section 15D directs the SEC to promulgate rules (to become effective no later than 
July 30, 2003) requiring investment banks to adopt structural reforms aimed at reducing the 
possibility of conflicts between the banks’ interest in attracting issuer clients and selling 
securities and the analysts’ interest in providing objective research.
17 As a primary means of 
preventing such conflicts of interest, these rules are to protect analysts from undue 
interference by bank employees active in investment banking activities.
18 Thus, for example, 
non-analyst personnel are to be restricted in their ability to determine the compensation of 
analysts or (except for legal and compliance officers) to clear or approve a research report 
prior to publication. Banks are also to be prohibited from taking retaliatory action against an 
analyst for issuing an unfavorable report.  
In addition to these restrictive rules, § 15D calls for rules requiring disclosure in 
research reports of a number of items that could indicate a conflict of interest.
19 These 
include: 
 any holding by the research analyst of securities of the issuer on whom he or she 
is reporting; 
 whether the bank or any affiliate (including the analyst) has received fees or other 
compensation from that issuer
20;  
 whether the issuer is or has during the year prior to publication of the report been 
a client of the bank and, if so, the nature of the services provided; and 
 whether the analyst’s compensation is tied (in part or in whole) to the bank’s 
investment banking revenue. 
B.  New SEC rulemaking 
The SEC has moved to address the concerns raised by Section 501 of the SOA by 
proposing
21 the new Regulation Analyst Certification (“Regulation AC”).
22 In so doing, the 
                                                 
17   The SOA permits the SEC to implement § 15D Exchange Act by direct rulemaking or by delegation to 
SROs. As discussed in § III.C. below, NASD and NYSE have in fact anticipated the SOA’s 
requirements to a significant extent.  
18   Exchange Act § 15D(a). 
19   Exchange Act § 15D(b).In the case of each of these disclosure items, a public appearance at which a 
research analyst discusses an issuer is deemed, for purposes of § 15D, equivalent to the publication of a 
research report. 
20   Section 15D(b)(2) permits an exception to be made, insofar as consistent with investor protection, 
where such disclosure would effectively reveal material non-public information about a potential future 
offering. 
21   SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-8119/Exchange Act Release No. 34-46301 (Aug. 2, 2002).  
22   17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-02 (proposed 2002). - 8 - 
SEC in large measure anticipated the provisions of Section 501. Although the SEC issued its 
proposal for Regulation AC after the entry into force of the SOA, the Commission had in fact 
begun work on this proposal prior to the SOA’s enactment (and had approved related NYSE 
and NASD rules several months prior thereto). Although the SEC has not to date done so, it 
noted in its release proposing Regulation AC that it may, alone or in collaboration with the 
SROs, take additional steps to implement the SOA’s requirements. 
As is often the case with SEC rulemaking, the proposed Regulation AC aims less to 
require or prohibit specific practices than to demand full disclosure of facts that may be 
material to an investor in making a properly informed investment decision. This approach is 
in keeping with the U.S. securities laws’ general philosophy of disclosure rather than “quality 
control”.
23  
The period for public comment on the proposed regulation that is required under U.S. 
administrative law ended on September 23, 2002. The SEC is currently considering the final 
form of Regulation AC. The final regulation may differ from the proposal in significant 
respects, so long as it (together with any future related rulemaking) implements the directives 
of Exchange Act § 15D. 
As proposed, Regulation AC would require that research reports clearly and 
prominently display certifications by the research analyst that:  
 the views expressed in the report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views 
about the subject securities and issuers; and 
 no part of the analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly 
related to the specific recommendation or views contained in the report; or  
 part or all of the analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly 
related to the specific recommendation or views contained in the report. In this 
case, the analyst must: 
-  disclose the purpose, source and (to the extent already received) the amount of 
such compensation, and  
-  warn that such compensation may influence the recommendation in the report.  
In addition, Regulation AC would require banks to create records of all public 
appearances by their research analysts at which an analyst makes a specific recommendation 
or offers an opinion concerning a security or an issuer. The bank must create a record for a 
public appearance within thirty days after the calendar quarter in which the appearance took 
place. The record must include certifications by the analyst that: 
 the views expressed in the public appearance accurately reflected the analyst’s 
personal views about the subject securities and issuers; and  
 no part of the analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly 
related to any specific recommendations or views expressed in the appearance.  
If the analyst is unable to give these certifications, the record of the appearance must note the 
fact, disclosing the reasons for the analyst’s inability. 
                                                 
23   See above, note 14. - 9 - 
It should be noted that the SEC has gone beyond the minimum requirements of the 
SOA by making the provisions of Regulation AC applicable to research reports covering debt 
securities as well as equity.  
C.  NASD and NYSE rulemaking 
In implementing securities laws, the SEC frequently relies to a great degree (as 
discussed in § I.A. above) on subsidiary rulemaking through SROs. The reform of research 
practices is no exception. In April 2002, the SEC approved revisions by the NASD and the 
NYSE to their rules concerning analyst conflicts of interest.
24  
These new rules address subjects previously not covered by the rules of these SROs. 
The NASD and the NYSE coordinated their rulemaking closely, with the effect that the 
analyst conflicts of interest rules of both SROs are, in contrast to the past, now essentially 
identical in substance and effect. Unlike the SEC’s proposed Regulation AC, however, the 
new NASD and NYSE rules apply only with respect to equity securities. 
The NASD and NYSE rules contain a number of specific restrictions and 
prohibitions. In addition, they require prominent disclosure of facts that may indicate 
potential conflicts of interest.
25 Banks subject to these rules must adopt written procedures 
designed to ensure compliance by the bank and its employees. A senior officer of the bank 
must attest annually that the bank has adopted and implemented those procedures. 
1.  Restrictions and prohibitions on banks  
Under the NASD and NYSE rules, a bank may not: 
 submit a research report to the subject company before its publication. Under the 
supervision of its legal or compliance department, however, the bank may provide 
the company with specific sections of the draft report solely to verify factual 
accuracy of the information in those sections. In no case may the company receive 
the research summary, the research rating or the price target; 
 pay any form of compensation to a research analyst based on a specific investment 
banking services transaction; or 
 directly or indirectly (i) offer favorable research or a specific rating or price target, 
or (ii) threaten to change research, a rating or a price target, to a company as 
consideration or inducement for business or compensation. 
The rules also restrict the ability of banks to publish research during “quiet periods” 
following the bank’s involvement in an issuer’s offering of securities. Specifically, banks that 
have acted as manager or co-manager in an offering must refrain from publishing research for 
40 days following an IPO and for 10 days following a secondary offering.
26 The rules provide 
an exception for reports during these periods that discuss the effects on the issuer of 
                                                 
24   NYSE Rule 472 (amended); new NASD Rule 2711; approved in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-
45908 (May 10, 2002); published in 67 F.R. 34968 (May 16, 2002).  
25   Multi-issuer research reports covering the securities of six or more issuers may incorporate the required 
disclosures by reference to other reports covering these issuers. In this case, the multi-issuer report 
must clearly inform readers where they can obtain the referenced disclosures in written or electronic 
form.  
26   Note that the NASD and NYSE rules are modeled on, albeit for a somewhat different purpose, the best-
practices standards developed by banks as discussed in § II.A. above. - 10 - 
significant news or new events. The bank’s legal or compliance department must authorize 
any such report prior to its publication. In addition, the rules specifically exempt reports 
published following non-IPO offerings pursuant to the SEC’s Rule 139.  
2.  Restrictions and prohibitions on investment banking departments  
Under the new rules, a bank’s investment banking department (or any employees 
thereof) may not: 
 exercise supervision or control over research analysts; or 
 review or approve a research report before its publication (except to verify factual 
accuracy of information or to identify potential conflicts of interest, and then only 
through or under the supervision of an authorized legal or compliance official of 
the bank). 
3.  Restrictions and prohibitions on research analysts  
The new rules subject research analysts to a number of restrictions on trading. In 
particular, an analyst may not: 
 purchase or receive any securities of an issuer before the issuer’s IPO if the issuer 
is principally engaged in the same types of business as other companies that the 
analyst follows; or 
 purchase or sell any security (or related option or derivative) of an issuer that the 
analyst follows during a period beginning 30 calendar days before, and ending 
five calendar days after, the publication of a research report concerning the issuer 
or a change in a rating or price target of the issuer’s securities. 
The rules provide exemptions for certain classes of transactions, e.g., trades made 
through a mutual fund in which the analyst has no investment discretion. Banks may also 
permit their analysts to trade in circumstances that would, under the rules, otherwise bar the 
analyst from trading. Banks may grant such permission only in accordance with policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the transaction does not create a conflict of 
interest between the analyst’s professional responsibilities and personal trading activities. All 
such grants of permission require the approval of the bank’s legal or compliance department 
and are subject to record-keeping and disclosure obligations. 
In addition, no analyst may trade in a security, even if the trade would otherwise be 
permissible under the rules, in a manner inconsistent with the recommendation in the bank’s 
most recent research report covering the security. 
4.  Required disclosures of securities ownership and material conflicts of interest  
Banks must disclose in each research report, and research analysts must disclose at 
each public appearance: 
 whether the analyst or a member of the analyst’s household has a financial interest 
in the securities of the subject company and, if so, the nature of that interest; 
 whether the analyst or a member of the analyst’s household serves as an officer, 
director or advisory board member of the subject company; 
 whether the bank or any affiliate, as of the end of certain defined periods 
immediately preceding the publication of the report or the date of the appearance, - 11 - 
beneficially owns 1% or more of any class of common equity securities of the 
subject company; and 
 any other actual, material conflict of interest of the bank or analyst of which the 
research analyst knows or has reason to know at the time of the publication or 
appearance. 
A bank must also disclose in its research reports whether it was making a market in 
the subject company’s securities at the time the report was published. 
5.  Required disclosures concerning compensation 
Research reports must disclose whether: 
 the principal research analyst responsible for the report received compensation 
based upon (among other factors) the bank’s investment banking revenue; and 
 the bank or any affiliate  
-  managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject 
company, or received compensation for investment banking services from the 
subject company, during the past 12 months; or 
-  expects to receive (or intends to seek) compensation for investment banking 
services from the subject company during the next 3 months. 
In addition, a bank’s research analysts must disclose in public appearances whether 
they know or have reason to know that the subject company is a client of the bank or its 
affiliates. 
6.  Required disclosures concerning ratings and price targets  
Research reports must: 
 define the meaning of each rating term used in the bank’s rating system; these 
definitions must be consistent with the terms’ plain meanings; 
 disclose, regardless of the actual rating terms the bank uses, the percentage of all 
securities rated by the bank to which the bank would assign a “buy,” 
“hold/neutral,” or “sell” rating; 
 disclose the percentage of subject companies within each of these three categories 
for whom the bank has provided investment banking services within the previous 
twelve months; 
 present a line graph, in any research report concerning an equity security for 
which the bank has assigned any rating for at least one year, of that security’s 
daily closing prices for the shorter of (i) the period during which the bank has 
assigned any rating or (ii) a three-year period, indicating: 
-  the dates on which the bank assigned or changed each rating or price target; 
and 
-  each rating and price target assigned or changed on those dates; and 
 disclose the valuation methods used to determine a price target. Price targets must 
have a reasonable basis and be accompanied by disclosure of the risks that may 
impede achievement of the target. 
 
 - 12 - 
IV.  SEC Enforcement Actions 
In addition to its rulemaking function (whether exercised directly or through 
delegation to an SRO), the SEC is responsible for monitoring compliance with securities law 
and regulations and taking enforcement action against violators.
27 As in the case of SEC and 
SRO rulemaking in this area, SEC enforcement actions related to improper use of research 
were already underway before the enactment of the SOA; the new law has given the SEC’s 
efforts additional impetus. 
On January 9, 2003 the SEC filed a civil action
28 in federal district court against a 
managing director and senior research analyst employed by a California-based investment 
bank that played a major role in the wave of securities offerings by technology companies 
during the 1990s and early 2000s.
29 The SEC’s complaint alleges that, in issuing research 
reports and making public statements regarding mergers proposed by two public companies, 
the analyst failed to disclose that he would, as a result of his stock ownership, profit 
significantly upon completion of each of the mergers. The complaint alleges further that the 
analyst’s “buy” recommendation on another public company was false, misleading and 
inconsistent with his privately-held belief. 
The SEC complaint charges that, through these actions, the analyst violated Exchange 
Act § 10 (b) as well as Rule 10b-5. Together, the statutory provision and the rule prohibit 
false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The 
complaint also charges the analyst with violating Securities Act § 17(a), which prohibits 
material false or misleading statements and failure to disclose material facts in the offer or 
sale of securities. 
In its prayer for relief, the SEC requests that the court permanently enjoin the analyst 
from future violations of these statutory provisions and Rule 10b-5.
30 It also seeks to force the 
analyst to disgorge his profits from the transactions in question (including interest from the 
time of the alleged violation) and to pay a monetary fine. 
Following the recent decline of the stock markets, the SEC together with the NASD, 
the NYSE, the Attorney General of New York and several other regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities initiated a major program to reform certain investment banking 
practices widely held to have contributed to the overvaluation and eventual collapse of the 
markets. All these practices created conflicts of interest, many of them related to the use of 
research. On December 20, 2002, the SEC announced that it and the other authorities had 
agreed with a group of the nation’s leading investment banks to a settlement that would avoid 
the need for litigation alleging violations of Exchange Act § 10 and Rule 10b-5. 
                                                 
27   The SEC has power to bring administrative and civil actions. It has no authority to bring criminal 
charges, but can (and often does) request that prosecutors commence criminal actions. 
28   SEC v. Johnson, No. 03 CV 0177 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2003); see also SEC Litigation Release No. 17922 
(Jan. 9, 2003). 
29   In this matter the investment bank settled with the SEC by signing a consent decree and paying a total 
of $5 million in disgorged profits and fines. On January 9, 2003 the SEC also brought a separate 
lawsuit against the bank for alleged misconduct unrelated to the research activities at issue in Johnson. 
30   The SEC frequently makes use of injunctions in its enforcement efforts. This technique makes it 
significantly easier to take action against the violator for any similar violations in the future, as such 
future violations would constitute contempt of court, permitting the court to take immediate and direct 
steps against the violator even in advance of a civil lawsuit by the SEC. - 13 - 
With respect to research activities, each bank obligated itself under this agreement: 
 to sever the links between research and investment banking, including analyst 
compensation for equity research and the practice of analysts accompanying 
investment banking personnel on pitches and road shows; 
 to contract, for a minimum five-year period, with no less than three independent 
research firms to provide research to the bank’s customers; and 
 to facilitate investors’ comparative evaluation of its analysts’ performance by 
making ratings and price target forecasts publicly available.  
In addition, each of the banks agreed to pay fines, to contribute to a restitution fund for 
investors and to escrow monies to pay for independent research. The agreement calls for total 
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